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Agrarian Revolution and '. the Land Question in Buganda 
It is the irony of history that, despite the spectacular accom-
plishments of the Western European industrial revolution and the agricul-
tural revolution before it, most of mankind is still faced with the 
more pr'imitive problem of how to eke out a living from the soiL From 
the amount of knowledge and technological expertise that exists, one 
would have ~xpected that appropriate solutions would be readily attain-
able. But yet-not: recent history in underdeveloped countries belies 
such facile assumptions. If anything development elsewhere has proved 
more .of a liability than an asset to the late-starters. Not only is the 
w~ ahead blocked by entrenched vested interests, but also vision is 
obscured by certain historically determined belief systems and per-
ceptual categories. Nothing illustrates this point of view more vividly 
than the evolution of land policy and development in Buganda. (Uganda). 
The Traditional Past. 
It is still a question whether .18th and 19th century Buganda was 
a "feudal" society or not. For those who tr,eat ~he dyadic nature of the 
relationship between lord and vassal as the crucial variable and less 
so the association between office and landholding1 , Buganda had not 
r'eached the feudal stage by the time of the arrival of Europeans in the 
19th century. Those for whom association of office with estate and 
dependent tenure is equally crucial, Buganda had entered the feudal 
stage by the middle of the 19th century. Desire for descriptive accuracy, 
on' the 'one hand, and desire for theoretical precision or elegance, on 
the other, are understable intellectual inclinations but both could be 
misleading~ In the study of Buganda kingship, bureaucracy, royal and 
chiefly munificence, no doubt because of their spectacular and exotic 
features, have been objects of great descriptive accuracy. What went 
on underneath the splendour and the pomp received either no attention 
at ali as a basic historical process or becam:.zobj ect of blind empiri-
cism. And yet after the sudden collapse of the Buganda political edifice 
in 1966, that is what continues inexorably. Consequently, tE .. e.sl~.Y,E2-:l,8E.:;:­
ment ·0f....:g.roductiv!;)...,..,fa.I!.C.fil~cm<1-P.£2.c<1Rgjj,.2,rL.r..§,lg,:tj,QnJ?~~.n.J2ugand a will be 
the main concern in this ess~~ 
1. . e. g. E.M. Chilver, Jack Goody and H. W. West. 
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AB is to be expected of any agrarian societ;Yt_ land in Bug8l1da,is, and 
has been, the greatest source of sustenance and wealth. However, its 
distribution and what it produces as a result of human labour has 
undergone a number of significant changes in the last hundred years or 
so. First, it is believed by the various specialists on Ganda society 
- that, at least, before the 19th century Buganda was occupied by autono-
mous descent groups, viz. clans, with probably the Kabaka (king) 
being primus inter pares (see Mair, 1933; pp. 187-205, Richards, 1959; 
pp. 45-46, Fallers, 1964; p. 91, and West, 1964; pp. 1-2). The Baganda 
also believe this to be the case: 
"When the Kings came into the country ••••••• they found 
clans •••••• possessing the land. The hills were occu-
pied by the clans, a clan would have its hill, each 
clan had a head who was practically the ruler of the 
clan. When the king came in he began to drive out these 
people and gave land to favourites who were members of 
the clan in that part of the country; the land thus 
given was called but aka. When he got stronger he took 
the land from the members of the clan and gave it to 
favourites (not of the clan); they were called batongole 
and the land given to them butongole" 1 
Exactly how the balance of power between the clan-heads (bat aka) and 
the king was maintained for more than thirty generations2 and precisely 
why it only changed during the 19th century, it is not clear from the 
literature or from oral tradition. But, without any further evidence, 
it would not be unreasonable to suggest a correlation between accumu-
lation of surplus by the Kabaka and his supporters through a predatory 
and imperialist economy during the 19th century3 and the mergence of 
the Kabaka as the supreme ruler of Buganda. 
The apparent contradiction between state-formation by the Kabaka 
and maintenance of local autonomy by kindred groups notwithstanding, 
it is quite clear that at an early period clan and li~eage leaders 
(bataka) in Buganda, like elsewhere in Africa, were responsible for 
allocation of land among kinsmen and that the latter by virtue of their 
1. As quoted by Chilver in Richards, 1959; _ p. 380. 
2. The last Kabaka of Buganda, Mutesa II, is believed to be the 34th 
successor of the founding king of Buganda, Kintu (Cf. Richards, 
£E. £ii., p. 43 and Fallers, £E. £ii., p. 75). 
3. It was during this period that Buganda, through military conquest, expand-
ed to more than six times its or:j.J~i:pal size. Above all, there is 
every indication that the Kabaka had complete disposition over the 
loot and plunder from conquered territories. The direct control over 
the army and most of the externally derived surplus must have been 
more than sufficient for him to establish himself over the clan 
leaders and the rest of the. population. 
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membership in the clan regarded this as their inalienable right. The 
land was theirs in more than just a metaphorical sense. Insofar as the 
bataka were not entitled to any fees, tribute, or labour services for 
performing their kinship duties, their route to primitive accumulation 
was blocked. Insofar as land was a free commodity within the clan and 
insofar as the primary producers expended their labour-power for their 
own benefit, they suffered no exploitation. 1 But insofar as each clan 
head had the right to settle tenants on the clan land and receive per-
sonal profit from dues and tribute and, probably, services, the road to 
primitive accumulation was open; and insofar as the majority of clans-
men did not settle on their clan estates but, instead, sought favour 
with more powerful estate masters, there was general exploitation; if 
not int ensi ve. 
The successful intervention by the Kabaka from the middle of the 
19th century onwards marked the emergence of a new mode of economic and 
political organization. It represented a movement away from clan esta-
tes to fiefs or benefices in land. In the newly acquired areas, where 
there were no established Ganda clan estates, this was not difficult to 
achieve. The Kabaka merely created administrative domains (butongole) 
in the charge of his trusted officers (batongole). Even in the areas 
where the clans were dominant, it does not seem that the king was short 
of supporters who saw opportunities for self-aggrandizement in the new 
set-up. Prospects for personal control over land and people and a direct 
share in the surplus. extracted from within and from without were not 
only a sufficient inducement to ambitious individuals but were also 
the surest way of avoiding being an object of the same policies. Clan-
ship and heredity as sources of power were being supplanted by an appoin-
tive system, wherein power was exercised solely at the king's grace or 
pleasure. From the point of view of the analogy with feudalism in 
Europe, it is worth noting here that in the late 19th century political 
status in Buganda determined control over land and not the other w~ 
round, as was the case in Europe where land rights were hereditary. 
1. This would be untrue only if there was taxation or any other form 
of exaction by the Kabaka. But there is no evidence to confirm that. 
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Irrespective of the changing fortunes of the Kabaka's appointees, 
by the end of the 19th century two classes of people or status categories 
in Buganda had been firmly established, viz. ·the chiefs or "lords" (bami) 
who were the appointees of the Kabaka and the undistinguished residue 
of the population (bakopi). In addition to clan tenure (butaka) which 
was getting attenuated, two important land relations had become perva-
sive, viz. fiefs (butongole) for the political elite and tenantry 
(busenze) 1 for the governed. In practice this implied a virtual· extinc-
tion of communal land rights as a means of livelihood and a complete 
disappearance of local autonomy in favour of centralised control. The 
Kabakahad, as the Luganda metaphor goes, "eaten up" or "owned" the 
whole of Buganda. He had become the supreme. lord and every Muganda was 
his "man" or servant. 
Earlier we postulated a direct link between state-formation in 
Buganda and the extraction and use of surplus,· while not denying the 
fact that organization of primary production remained the same through-
out the period under consideration. In Buganda each household, includ-
ing that of the Kabaka and the chiefs, depended. on its own labour for 
subsistence. AQ::t;u.ally, women were the :t..e.aL..cu-ltivator.s_.o.f..thesoil, while 
-,_.- -.-- ... "~'--" -.--"'"--".-~-~.~ .--_.- "-"- . 
rri~liE:.EJ contribution di<1... !l()~go any further than_the. initial clearing 
qf the ground, occasional hunting and fishing. But for the plots they. 
cuI ti vat ed the women depended on men. As has been mentJoned . .already, 
~-,--~ ... "" _. - ,- --,." '.- - "-" - -' . ", 
the latter acquired access to land by "attaching themselves in loyal 
dependence to ___ a .. ~~:perior" - normally, a member of the rultngelite. 
As has been stressed earlier, the political elite depended on the 
Kabaka for their estates. This tiered dependence established a system 
of services which put the Buganda economy far beyond a mere household 
economy. For the land he received a mukopi ("peasant") paid tribute 
and dues to his overlord and rendered him services as a craftsmap, house-
builder and warrior. The chiefs, on their part, served the Kabaka by 
keeping the population under strict supervision, by collecting taxes 
and tribute and by raising an army for raiding the neighbouring states. 
In this w~ an economy of predation, not pro~uction, was created and 
the spoils - livestock, women,slaves, iv~ry and barkcloth _. shared 
among the elite as part of the Kabaka's bounty. 
Once again, it should be noted that insofar as the Baganda bakopi 
As against kibanja, a tenant plot: bibanja plural. 
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("peasants") were not tied to the soil1 nor were they obliged to tend 
their master's fields, they were not serfs in, the European sense. Inso-
far as the Baganda chiefs held their estates only by virtue of their 
political appointments2 and had no hereditary titles or rights in land, 
they are not comparable to the European feudal lords. But their effec-
tive control over land and people in their life-time not only afforded 
them opportunities for primitive accumulation, but also created condi-
tions for possible consolidation of their power and disposition over 
land. This is precisely what happened afterwards. In 1888 a clique of 
royal appointees conducted a coup and expelled the Kabaka (who must have 
been trying to keep them in check) and established themselves as the 
new masters of the state. Fortunately for them the newly arrived British 
colonialists accepted them as such. 
The Colonial Past 
Buganda was actually declared a British Protectorate in 1894 but 
the cross-roads in land policy was not reached until 1900. It was in 
that year that Sir Harry Johnston, the British Special Commissioner 
for the Protectorate of Uganda (Buganda), signed the famous Uganda 
Agreement with the Buganda new political captains. The terms of the 
Agreement are a clear indication of the extent to which the chiefs had 
managed to consolidate their power, at least, against the general 
population. Similarly, they are a reflection of their skill in taking 
advantage of the'new alliance with the British, without suffering most 
of its disadvantages. As one observer puts it: 
"In addition to being the residuary administrators of 
their areas the Bakungu (appointed chiefs) were, to 
begin with, both personal representatives of the Kabaka 
(by this time a minor) and supporters of his throne. 
They were, too, the powerful disposers of jurisdiction 
over land and peasants and political leaders of the 
atmost importance" (Low and Pratt, 1960; p. 47). 
La.nq,a:g.ever failing source of political power and control over 
PE?gJ?tE3 and resourcE::_s, inevitably became the primary concern of the 
chiefs in their negotiations with Johnston. The latter's fUndamental 
1. They had the rig~.fremoval (kusenguka) and a chance of being 
appointed to a chieftainship. 
2. They were subject to demotions and dismissals and in the circums-
tances reverted to the status of ordinary bakopi. 
) 
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lack of understanding of the land situation in Buganda, compounded by 
English feudal preconceptions and naive notions about "tribal land" in 
Africa, did more to bring Buganda closer to real feudalism than anything 
else. But, notwithstanding Johnston's follies, Britain, as a socio-, 
economic force, represented something quite different. It represented 
advanced European capitalism which Buga11da could not escape, ,despite 
its chiefly atavism. Buganda had moved irrevocably from a situation 
where the country was seen as divided into a hierarchy of domains of 
jurisdiction attainable at the Kabaka's grace to a situation where 
rights in land were vested in individual holders in perpetuity. Johnston's 
mailo 1 system, as it got to be known afterwards, acted as a double-
edged sword. It at once complemented the feudalist ambitions of the 
chiefs in Buganda and, at the 'same time,. created grounds for the emer-
gence of capitalism in the area. Cultivation of cash crops made it 
possible for individual landowners to acquire wealth by means ,other 
than primitive accumulation or predation. 
Who were the fortunate individuals? When the Agreement was signed 
on 10 March, 1900, it limited individual rights in land to "1,000 
chiefs and landowners - the Kabaka, the Regents and senior chiefs, and 
some mino r chi efs" (these turned out to be more than 4,000). The Kabaka, 
m.~m?_ers ()~..!h~ roy:~,~ family, the Regent s (and two othe:r: imJ:l(),r,ta!lt 
chiefs), and sazza chiefs (county chiefs) were to receive specified 
amounts of land, which added up to about 700 square miles of private 
and official estates. The rest of the allottees were tb share about 
8,000 square miles. At this time before any proper land: surveys had 
been made, measurements were bound to be inaccurate. But it is suffi-
cient to note that each allottee received at the average about two 
square miles, while the senior chiefs and the Regents fell in the 
range of 15-45 square miles each, and a grand total of 350 square 
miles for the Kabaka. It was "ariJ:L1Qcracieswithin,ar-is:t~<2.2F.,g,Q.i.es", as 
Low so aptly p~~sit. The immediate implication of the Agreement was 
~ to exclude the rest of the population from enjoying similar rights 
in land as the chiefs i.e. not only were they deprived of rights of 
ownership ab initio but also their rights of occupancy, compared to 
most Africa, received no attention at all. 
As a result of the Agreement, under statutory law only three 
types of land tenure were recognised in Buganda, viz. -
1. The allotments were measured in square miles and 'hence the 
coinage by the Baganda, mailo. 
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(a) Public land known as Crown land (about 6,800 square miles) 
(b) Land held by the Kabaka, chiefs and private landowners known 
as. mailo land, divided into official mailo (about 700 square 
miles) and private mailo (about 8,000 square miles). 
(c) Freehold1 which was land transferred from the Crown. to indivi-
duals or corporations (104 square miles). 
Subjectively, this did not have any immediate impact on the people's 
consciousness. Humble supplication to a mailo owner as a method of. 
gaining access to land sufficed as much as it did to the Kabaka's chie·fs 
in the period prior to the Agreement. But, objectively, the dissocia-
tion of rights over land from governmental functions created a new 
type of property relations. Land had become a salable commodity at the f" 
complete disposal of individuals who had a legal obligation neither 
to the Kabaka nor to the people settled on their land. Secondly, within 
a few years land became an important commodity for investment and 
generation of continuous wealth through exploitation of hired ~abour -
another novel relationship, employers and employees among the indige-
nous popUlation (cf. areas of white settlement elsewhere in Africa 
where only whites were capitalist employers). 
The imperialist muddling and feudal trappings notwithstanding, 
Buganda had entered a new economic era which was heralded by the 
arrival of the first sacks of cotton from America in December, 1903. 
As Wrigley remarks: "From then on the economy was on a new and solid 
footing. By applying their fertile soil to the production of specia~ 
lised crops for the world market the Baganda and other people of the 
Protectorate not only soon achieved independence of imperial subsidies 
but attained a much higher level of income than they had ever been 
abl e to acquire by the old methods" (vJri gl ey in Fall ers, op. cit.; p. 33). 
In answering the question, "Who was to have the direction of this pro'-
cess?" and "How were the proceeds t() be distributed?",· Wrigley writes: 
" •••••••••• it had undoubtedly been assumed that the new 
economy •••••••• would'be managed, like old, by the chi efs, 
who woul.d act as entrepreneurs and develop their estates 
after the. manner of English landowners. And it seemed' at 
first that this was how things would in fact be done. The 
chiefs did just what was required of them insetting the 
peasants to work on the cotton fields in 1904. The pro~ 
ject was launched by means of written agreements between its 
1. The highest figure ever reached in this categOry is 345 square miles 
or 1.9 per cent of the total land area in Buganda (BugandaPlanning 
Commission Report, 1965). 
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authors, the British-owned Uganda Company, and certain pro-
minent Baganda, the former undertaking to supply seed and 
instruction and to buy the crop, the latter to see that the 
seed was planted and the cotton in due course delivered to 
the Company" (in Fallers, Ope cit.; p. 34). 
The people were being mobilized to increase production for the benefit 
of a British Imperial company, for imperial administration and the poli-
tical elite in Buganda. In as much as cotton production did increase 
from about 54 bales valued at £236 in 1904 to the impressive figure of 
13,378 bales worth £165,412 in 1911 and accounted for half of the total 
exports of the Protectorate, Buganda was experiencing growth without __ 
development. The people were neither the objects nor the subjects of 
development. Only the new landowner-chiefs were regarded as such. After 
a promising start, however, progress began to slacken and the landowners 
were not fulfilling the expectations of their benefactors. A number of 
reasons were advanced, to explain the apathy of the landowner-chiefs. 
Some commentators such as Wrigley believe that "the d,ynamic oligarchs 
of the earlier period had for the most part become, or been succeeded 
by a race of comfortable country squires and rcutine administrators", 
who, invariably, "looked on their land, not ~s a factor of production, 
but as a capital asset" i. e. sales and dues from tenants were the 
easiest route to prosperity. West, writing several years later, holds 
almost the same view that "landlords made practically no entrepreneu-
rial or technical contribution to the management and development of 
.their land, but instead remained in a passive state as lmpersonal rent 
farmers whose attitude has changed but little from the traditionai con-
cept of 'estates of administration'" (West, unpublished manuscript, 1967). 
For perfectly good reasons the landowner-chiefs were falling Qut 
of. favour. British imperialism would have been a strange imperialism, 
indeed, if it. were to support the ambitions 0·£ an unknown bunch of 
chiefs for their own sake. Production was its main concern. Between 
1910-15 production had been observably slipping out of the hands of the 
r . 
chiefs into thos~peasant producers. Consequently, by 1916 there had 
developed a feeling among British administrators in favour of the 
producers and gainst the landowners., Peasant producers came to be 
regarded as the agents of progress and, therefore, proper objects of 
solicitude. This was in contrast to the chiefs who were now seen as a 
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"forested plutocracy" or "mere parasites" who got richer by extorting 
money and services from the true producers. Obviously, feudalistic 
trappings had become an encumbrance on the new mode of production and 
land policy and production relations had to be revised accordingly. 
What was the new mode of production? Properly speaking, one should 
not talk about peasant production in Buganda before 1900. Peasant pro-
duction in Buganda, as far as it existed at all, was a consequence of 
individualization of rights in land and the introduction of cotton 
cultivation for the world market. While at first cotton production was 
geared towards demesne farming, soon after the peasants, who had easy 
access to good soil as ten9llts; were able to convert their labour dues 
into cash pqrments and to expend their labour on their own plots. As 
has been alluded to already, small-scale. production came to predominate 
in Buganda from 1916 onwards - bearing in mind that even the operations 
. of the landowners were not much different in techniques and scale from 
those of their tenants. However, of critical structural importance is 
the emergence in the succeeding decade of a substantial number of small 
producers on independent plots. This was accounted for by two processes: 
(i) fragmentation of the origipal estates through inheritance and 
sal.es; and (ii) upward mobility by tenants through purchase of land 
from the cotton proceeds. Wrigley's poetic formulation testifies to the 
same: 
"Thus there arose. an agrarian middle-class of landowners 
whose property was measured, not in square miles as 
hitherto, but in tens of acres. This class was formed 
by a double movement from above and below. It was 
composed on the one hand of the joint inheritors of 
once large estates and' by proprietors who had sold· 
off the greater part of their lands, and on the other 
by the new men who were re-entering rural society 
from outside by purchasing a modest position in the ranks of. the 
landowning class" (in Fallers, OPe cit.; p. 39). 
In the long-run independent peasant production is incompatible with 
feudalistic control almost in the same manner as advancing cap:i,talis:t; 
.~~ -, --' 
farming is antithetical to p~a~~!.C:]J.ltivation. These are the con-
tradictory motions which found expression in Buganda at one and the 
.same time. No sooner had c.ash crop production been established in 
1 • . One does not have to exaggerate the plight of the tenants in 
Buganda in order to arrive at valid theoretical conclusions about 
.the negative implications of the system as such. 
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Buganda and the new economic opportunities recognised by individuals 
than certain tensions were felt in society. The landowner-chiefs sought 
1 to maXimise their benefits by making excessive demands on the peasants. 
In 1926 the Lukiiko (Bugand~ Legislative Assembly) tried to fix these 
by legislation at the increased rates of 35 per cent of the cotton cul-
tivated by the tenants, two pounds of cof·fee for every ten pounds grown 
and one pound out of every ten pounds of any other cash product (cf 
Low and Pr~tt·,op. cit.; p. 237). This elicited a sharp response from 
the administration which had made up its mind as far back as 1924 to 
"do everything possible to encourage the appearance and multiplication 
of the peasant proprietor". Reports of "frequent and general evictions" 
of the peasants by the landowners (see Low and Pratt, OPe cit.; pp. 110-
111) and continued agitation by the Bat aka, other minor chiefs and in:-
dividuals who did not have any land, or not as much as they had expect-
2 
ed, gave the colonial government a perfect excuse for striking at their 
erstwhile allies, the landowner~chiefs. On 15 October, 1926 the govern-
ment publicly declared "its intention of insisting upon the passage of 
legislation to ensure security of tenure to native occupiers and for the 
limitation and regulation of rents and tribute in kind". Accordingly, 
towards the end of 1927 there was enacted in Buganda, against the wishes 
of the ruling Buganda oligarchy, the so-called Busulu and Envujjo Law. 
~ Its significance is that it guarantBed security of tenure to the pea-
sants, as long as they met their stipulated obligations of ten shillings 
dues (busulu)per annum and a tithe (nvu,j,jo) of four shillings per annum 
in respect of each acre or part thereof under cotton or coffee. This was 
an important charter for the peasants and protected them from immediate 
exploitation. But, as shall be seen later, while attempting to obviate 
the effects of a particular structural contradiction, it created yet 
another structural inc?ngruity. In fact, it is our hypothesis that the 
British by their various policies in Buganda created such distortions 
or contrary motions that what would have been Buganda's agrarian and 
capitalist revolutions in the first half of this century were still-
born. 
1. A government commission, consisting of Sir Charles Griffins and J.C.R. 
Surrock, was appointed in 1924.to investigate land distribution in 
Buganda. In its report the Commission referred to exactions by the 
landowners, "great or small", which in some cases resulted in appro-
priation of up to one-third of the peasant's produce. 
2. Thomas and Spencer identified these as "essentially a club of 'have-
nots' banded together against the 'haves'" (Spencer & Thomas, 1938; p. 70). 
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The Later Phase 
If we ,accept the fact that production was the immediate and over-
riding concern of the British, 1 then we have to acknowledge the contra-
dictions mentioned above as a mandatory price of "progress" payable 
by the Baganda. ,Structural contradictions (inherent and imposed) not-
withstanding, native production continued to increase in Buganda. To-
wards the end of the 'twenties production had expanded ·from cotton to 
coffee. Froml%~~nningS and an actual count of 350.,0.0.0. trees or 60.0. 
acres in 1922, between 1926-29 coffee had started to compete with cotton 
in money value with the consequent increase. in acreage throughout the 
thirties. For instance, by 1937 coffee acreage had reached 30.,8080. :..: of 
, , 
course, not to beat, cotton production at, abou:c: 15,0.0.0. b~les in the same yearo 
Against the background of the. quantitative aspects of production 
in Buganda at this time, there are a number of qualitative points which 
need high-lighting. It is without doubt that the interw~ period s~w 
the victory of the small producers in Buganda. It was they who deter-
mined not only th,e pace but also the volume of production in the agri-
cultural economy. This has led some analysts to talk about Ha firmly 
established peasant' economy" in Buganda at this time. The scale of pro-
duction (3-5 acre plots) would Vfarrant this supposition. But property 
and production relations preclude such a claim. First, it was a small 
minority of Baganda producers who owned their farm land either as 
f.amilies or as individuals. o.wnership of land remained an exclusiv~ 
right of the privileged by birth or other financial endowment. Second, 
the word "peasant" as used in Buganda at th.is time shouid not be taken 
to connote the labouriousness assobi1'1-t.~d wi tP..it.,~!!QtlJ.er parts of the 
: w~;ld. From the earliest times of this century the Baganda small-scale 
.. p,roducers were emJ?loyers of cheap foreign labour. As early as 1923' 
ahinflux of 4,50.0. immigrants into Buganda was recorded and it was 
reported that the bulk.()fthes.e was "absorbed by Gandafarmers". 2 Thus, 
by 1934 Mair was able to report that wage-labour, drawn exclusively 
from alien tribes had become a normal ,feature of G ana. a life and that a 
1. Powesland in Richards, 1954; p. 27. 
2. Supposedly, this could have been achieved by alienating large tracts 
of land to white settlers. But at what cost in the Buganda situa~ 
tion? 
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man who grew an acre or two of cotton liked to employ about f'iy~. :lap()'lJ,;r:'.erEL 
(Mair, 1934; pp. 132-7).1 Nor did this extraction of la~our-power end 
there. The Baganda males universally depended on the efforts of their 
womenfolk for subsistence. 
Wherefore, while recognising the over-all exploitation of the 
majority of the Baganda producers by the colonial state and its agen-
cies: 
"The increment of wealth that had accrued to the people 
through production for export was hardly spectacular. 
A rough calculation shows that in 1928-29, a season of 
high yields and good prices, "the cotton crop yielde,d 
approximately £7 to every tax-payer in Busoga and'£6 
to every tax-payer in other parts of the Eastern Provin-
ce and in Buganda ••••••• Taxation, too ,wa.s heavy. 
In 1929 the Uganda Government's revenue, at £1,682,990, 
amounted almost to 40 per cent of the national export 
income'. The cultivator of the Eastern Province was mUlcted 
of Shs. 21 in direct taxation alone; and his counter~ 
part in Buganda paid Shs. 15 to the Central Government 
and •••••••• a further Shs. 10 to the Native authority" 
(Wrigley, OPe cit.; p. 57\, 
we should not overlook the internal processes of exploitation and the 
production relations which sustain them. The ,Baganda, who are described, 
objectively so too, as "better off than most triQes" in the area, bene-
fitted from and were in part responsible for the exploitation of their 
weaker or less fortunate neighbours. It comes as no surprise that, as 
is known to any field-wor1&.rin Buganda, they have great contempt for 
farm labour and generally regard themselves as an "employing class". 
Availability of cheap foreign labour also must have contributed to their 
indifference to collective effort in production and extreme individua-
lism even in the organization of family labour - a cornerstone of all 
peasant production. In this context a comment by Audrey Richards is 
illuminating: 
"We do not pretend to have done an intensive stu¢iy 
of the family unit in Buganda, but our surface im-
pressions were that it was rare to find husband 
and wife receiving help in cultivation from growing 
boys and girls, such as would be the practice in 
most peasant communities in Europe, let alone Africa. 
Furthermore, the common Bantu custom of organising 
working bees, by which the farmer brews beer or gives 
some other form of entertainment for friends or rela-
1.' Her observation were confirmed by Richards et al 1951-4 (Richards, 
Ope cit.; p. 205). 
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tives.who come and help to do heavy work, does not 
appear to exist in this area. Ganda comment that 
things are easier for the fore:ig-nerL'l because kinsmen 
live together,but, surprisingly enough, they hardly 
ever seem to emulate this type of family cooperation· 
or the working pattern of other African peoples" 
(££. cit.; p. 206). 
FrolIl the foregoing general discussion, are we t.e conclude that most of 
the Baganda producers, insofar as they rely heavily on hired labour and 
highly individualized production, are kulaks or rural capitalisxs? 
First, let it be stated as a general rule that peasants are iso-
lated producers but who rely more on family labour than anything. else. 
In contrast kulaks and agricultural capitalists rely more on hired 
labour than family labour. Nor is it just a question of the type of 
labour used. It is also a matter of qualitative difference brought about 
by a distinct combination of labour-power, tools and capital i.e. 
technologically and historically, the two categories represent diver-
gent tendencies. But the surprising thing in Buganda is that increased 
production at the time in question did not represent a qualitative 
change technologically. Generally-speaking, the scale and the techniques 
of production remained the same for all farmers. Talking about the same 
period, ,Wrigley concludes: 
"An acre or two was thus added to the cultivated area of 
each homestead, but, except on a few estates in Buganda, 
the general scale of farming operations had not sensibly 
altered. Nor - and here the big cotton· farmers of Buganda 
were no exceptions - had the techniques. Virtually the 
only technical innovation had been the substitution of 
imported steel hoes for local iron product" (op. cit.; p. 57). 
Entrepreneurship, in the classical sense, was not the dominant featu-
rue of production in Buganda at this point in time. Literally, nothing 
had been done to improve the efficiency of the African labour or would-
be-entrepreneurs. In short, the level of real capital - sci.entific and 
technological capacity - of the rural society in Buganda remained the 
same , despite the satisfaction of the imperialist demand which set in 
motion the whole process. The Protectorate Government was "comfortably 
solvent" and shortage of raw materials had ceased to be the principal 
worry of the manufacturers in L.ancashire. In other words, the Buganda 
economy operated mainly as a function of British industry and the world 
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. market. Even at the best of times, the Africans did net standto-bene-
fit technologically from their involvement with the British simply 
because the division of labour was also racially determined. Process-
, . . I 
ing, marketing and export trade was outside their scope - but no consumer 
goods were similarly classified. Does not incorporation into capitalist 
production and world market relations, without the benefit of the trans-
formational effects associated wjth the system, constitute the very 
essence of underdevelopment? 
The Final Phase 
The remarks made above. could, quite conceivably, draw a. thunder-
ous denial from the Members of the British Empire who, rightly or· wrongly, 
believed as late as 1935 that "the complex task of building a civilisa-
tion which, in its spiritual and material aspects alike, is beyond the 
present range of native imagination or aspirations". 1 The point at issue 
is preCisely whether introduced British capitalism was able to, or could, 
bring the range of imagination of the natives within the historical 
ambience of capitalism. Put in another way, could the local people, in-
stead of being .treated as objectj' of extended European capitalism, be 
allowed to be subj ects of a genuine capitalist transforInC3.tion in their -own 
right? The question goes far beyond the usual concern to create a native 
mlddle-class which actsas a source of stability and a never-failing 
bulwark against Bolshevism when the time comes. 
Summarizing the results of agricultural progress and increased 
prod~ction in Buganda up to World War II, Wnigley says: 
"On the other hand virtually nothing had been done to 
improve the efficiency of African Agriculture. r~h.e..:re-was 
._no .... evidence ... that-.the yield .of-:co:t:ten-··had.-i-ne·rea-s-ed ,_.,and 
the subsistence side of the economy had not been touched 
at all, sav-e-for--t·he .. iritro.duction--or wider-dissemination 
of that·un pal at able --andunnutrit·ious out'drought-resist ant 
..r-01?:t.,-.. ca~sava'' (£E.. ill·; p. 64). 
But Wrigley himself admits that by the end of the Second World War: 
" - - - - - - - - - the exigencies of inter-
national politics, the desparate plight of the sterling 
area, the prospect of an advance towards self-government 
immeasurably more rapid than had hitherto been envisaged 
- all these combined to make the growth of production 
1. Official communication as quoted by Thomas and Scott, 1935; p. 43. 
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and wealth in Uganda seem a matter of pressing urgency" (££. cit.;p. 67). 
In the period prior to World War II government efforts to im-
prove African agriculture had been limited to soil conservation and a 
doomed attempt to introduce tractors in Buganda. 1 Improved cotton strains 
were another contribution by the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation -
a British private firm. It was in the post-war circumstances that a 
romantic commitment to "a nation of small producers" gave way to the 
belief that the peasant producer had· "come to a full-stop" and could 
no longer be relied upon for further expansion of the economy. In the. 
manner of European development, "large..;..scale" farming was seen as the 
natural successor. to peasant production. But, unlike in Europe, the 
material conditions for its realisation did not exist. Even the "bigger" 
African producers in Buganda had not yet made any technological advance 
and the relations between them and their labour had not undergone any 
qualitative change. Workers remained labouring tenants, whose skills 
had changed .but little since the end of the 19th century. FundamElnt'allYf 
what we are confronted with here is an over-all level of real capital 
.which is too low to justify any capitalist expansion. Non-existence 
of a.local maXket for agricultural products was an added structural 
weakness. 
But looked at externally, through a process of spontaneous ad-
justment to colonialism, there appeared in post-war Bugahda a few iso-
lated individuals whp operated "enterprises of more than average size". 
Their appearance was made possible by a more or less fortuitous com-
b.ination of three factors - ownership. of sufficient amounts of land 
(inherited or purchased), favourable crop prices fOI',.a prolonged period, 
and increased labour inputs consequent on good market prices. The fo'r- . 
tlinate individuals caught the eye of the colonial administrators, 
"dabbed "prOfessional farmers", became the new objects of solicitude,· 
from the administration. They were to be recepients of government aid' 
in the ,form. of mechanization schools,· research institutes; training 
programmes ,and general extension services.· Wrigley, a not altogether 
unsympathetiC chronicler, notes: 
1. A broken terrain, heavy vegetation and'perennial crops in Buganda 
were bound to reduce the utility value of tractors even 
if other require1llents were fulfilled which were not. 
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"It was clear at any rate that mechanization was for 
the few, not for the many, and this brings us to a 
subtle and gradual change that was taking place in 
the pattern of the Department's work. In lieu of the 
handing down of rules, instructions and exhortation 
to an ignorant and, in theory, subservient peasantry 
there was emerging something more like an agricultural 
extension service as the term is understood in a civili-
sed state. The Department's officers were moving away 
from the heart-breaking task of raising the general 
level of African agriculture a notch or two up the 
scale of efficiency, and were turning to the more 
rewarding process of providing guidance to the minority 
of farmers who were both willing and able to profit 
from it" ( op. cit.; pp. 77-8). 
Suffice it to say, an Agricultural Productivity Committee, formed by 
the government as a response to its own desire for increased produc-
tivity, saw the so-called professional farmers as aGed-send and 
offically adopted them in 1953. In 1956 two Farm Institutes, intended 
to provide training for this type of farmer and the accompanying exten~ 
sion personnel, were established. In the same year a Farm Pla11TIing Unit 
was set up to provide guidance, in official terminology, "at the request 
of individual farmers or groups of farmers". 
The colonial government, having created a bureaucratic elite, 
was now out to create an agricultural elite after its own image. To 
what extent was the superstructurally contrived agricultural revolution 
a success, it may be asked. Perhaps, an observation by Wrigley towards 
the end of British Rule (1959) in Uganda can be used without prejudice, 
as the same phenomenon continued after Independence. The following 
are his words: "By no means all 'new men' were any better farmers from' 
a technical point of view than the simplest of the semi-subsistence 
cultivators". But, as if to console his compatriots, he adds; "There 
was, however, a slowly increasing number of men who not only willingly-
took but actually sought the advice of Agricultural Officers, whose 
attitudes and practices were beginning to assume a truly professional 
character" (2l?' cit.; p. 78). It would seem that, from the point of view 
of underdevelopment or "Jim-Crowed" agricultural revolution, what is 
more important than the said professionalism is the differential treat-
ment of the producers llY the government and the emergence of parasitic 
elitism as part of the colonial heritage. In contrast to the modest 
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amounts the government was spending on a few select farmers, it is esti-
mated that between 1943-1953 all agricultural produeers in Uganda (not 
Buganda), through the .device of Marketing Boards, involuntarily con~ 
tri buted nearly £30 million .to 'price assistance funds, about £22 million 
to development projects of all sorts (most ofther.1 non-agricultural) and an 
additional £30 million in export duties; and that during this period 
rarely did they receive as much as three-quarters of the actual market 
value of their produce. Inl3tead, the prices paid in some instances ranged as 
low as, 27 or 31 per cent of market prices. 1 It was a vertically ar-
ticulated system of, to employ a biological analogy, parasites, vectors 
and ho st s (vi ct ims ) • 
The Post-Independence Period 
The hypothesis that is being advanced at this stage of our analy-
sis is that parasitism is an aberrant feature of "Jim-Crowed" or "Shan-
ghaied,,2 capitalism. It is of special importance that the latter should 
be distinguished from normal capitalism, wherein exploitation is charac-
teristically possessed of dynamic imperatives i.e. it leads logically 
to a fuller mobilisation of resources and, above all, to a release of 
new energies among the exploiters (capitalists) and the exploited 
(proletarians) alike. It has been noted that in the case of Buganda 
bureaucratic fascination with "professional farmers" led neither to a 
qualitative change in agriculture3 nor to a release of new energies 
consonant with a capitalist revolution. But on the contrary it added 
to the existing strata of parasitic elites. The question then is, did 
change of government at Independence signify any fundamental changes 
in the organisation of production in agriculture? 
Historical occurences, justified or not, have their .own logic. 
The aberrations and contradictions mentioned above needed another full 
1. Figures computed by Wrigley (1959, p. 70) from the East African Stati-
stical Department Report - Background to the Budget, Nairobi, 1955. 
2. If this be unfamiliar usage, the idea of Negroes in the Southern 
Stat~ being limited to the railroads or of one being shipped awqy 
in a drugged state furnishes an accurate analogy to the situation 
we are describing. 
3. Monoculturalism continued to be the dominant feature of the agricul-
tural economy. In 1955, the best year ever, cotton and coffee 
accounted for 89% of agricultural export and 77% of all exports. 
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cycle for their implications even to be dimly recognised in Uganda. In 
the almost proverbial sense now Independence did not bring about any 
change 0 f att i tude towards development. lloth the national government 
of Uganda and the federal government of Buganda faithfully followed the 
colonial polipies, at least, in agriculture. For the colonial "prOfes-
sional farmers" they substituted "progressive farmers", whom the 
Department of Agriculture defi.ned as "a farmer who actively follows 
the advice and puts into practice the instructions given to him by the 
Department of Agriculture, or the Department of Veterinary Services 
and Animal Husbandry, for the proper management of his farm". These 
were to be the prized clients of the Department. In 1962-3, despite 
the failure of the tractor scheme introduced in 1948, a new mecha-
nisation scheme called the "Landmaster Scheme" was started in the main 
coffee county of Buddu in Buganda for the benefit of large-scale farmers. 
Two years later it was discovered that "mos.t of the landmasters in the 
Division were not in use or working order, owing to extreme difficulty 
in obtaining repairs and to mechanical inexperience of the farmers". 
Worse still , it was further reported by the appropriate authority that. 
"no farmer had approached one-third of the 360 hours per annum for cul-
tivation considered necessary in the survey which preceded the imple-
~entation of the scheme". 1 The scheme had to be abandoned in 1964 as 
a disastrous failure. 
All the same, the matter continued to be treated largely as a 
technical problem, solvable within the colonial ideological presuppo-
sitions about development. As if by a magic wand, Buganda contrived 
capitalism was expected to follow the well-known and proven route. 
Therefore, the Buganda government, not deterred by the Buddu experience, 
went ahead and announced a new estate-farming scheme in 1965 - admitt-
edly in a different area. This time the intention was to establish 
central farming units, to be known as Agricultural Development Com-
panies to which were to be linked a "number of peasant holdingsfl. To 
ensure sufficient capital inflow, non-African investors were to be 
encouraged to enter into a partnership with Africans to develop "out-
growers' schemes". Public land was to be leased specially for develop-
ment of "private estates". 
On the face of it , it was not the peasant who had "come to a 
1. Divisional Agricultural Annual Report, Masaka, 1965. 
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full':"'stop" this time but rather the strawmen of "progress'!. The resort 
by the Buganda government to "central farming" and to partnership with 
"non-Mrican investors" was a tacit aclmowledgement of the inability 
of the Mrican "progressive farmers" to achieve development. Instead 
of stating the matter in exactly those terms and ponder why, it sought. 
to mystify the people and to find easy substitutes for what they lacked. 
In the absence of a virile national bourgeoisie the -gbvernment .was 
proposing state capitalism as an alternative. But it had. no clear 
theory to it. Nor did it get any guidance or encouragement, from the 
national government. Objectively, Buganda still is a victim of a pre-
capitalist technology (used to mean more human capacities than simply 
tools). Secondly, its production relations in agriculture remain basi-
cally traditional, if only distorted by imposed production for an inter-
national market. Its land relations - neither feudal, peasant nor 
capitalistic but a peculiar amalgam of all three - are not a natural 
starting-point for any particular form of development. In such a situa-
tion it must have taken a singularly perverse mind to suppose that a 
handful of "progressive farmers" could bring about a capitalist 
revolution. This is a sad illusion which has come to tyrannize Buganda 
like. so many other underdeveloped regions. 
But as is well-lmown, disillusionment comes fast and solid in 
underdeveloped countries precisely because of the fragility of their 
basic structures. The collapse of world market prices in the early 
sixties exposed the technological backwardness of the Buganda "progres-
sive farmers". They undoubtedly lacked the innovativeness which would 
have helped them climb out of the rut of mono cuI turalism. A few al ter-
native crops to coffee and cotton e.g. tea, sugar -and vanilla needed 
new skills which could hardly be found. In 1966-7 (when in the field) 
a curious process was occurring. A fair proportion of the so-called 
"progressive farmers" were reverting to the peasant-plus type of agri-
culture, or to rentier farmers by simply abandoning all or part of their 
once prized coffee estates. They were laying off their' labour and gene-
rally complained that they had no money to pay for it or for "farm im-
provements". 1 But when asked what improvements would they introduce, 
if the money was available, it transpired that they had none in mind 
(except a few farmers who mentioned dairy farming in Mawokota and Buddu 
1. In practice this turned out to be the usual excuse for obtaining 
a 10 an from the government 
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count~ies). Nor was this a simple case of lack of imagination. The farmers 
interviewed had in common certain social characteristics which might ex-
plain their personal limitations. First, most' of ljhem were either illitera-
te or had a few years primary education.' Second, as much as half in a sample 
of 110 had passed their most productive age (over 55 years of age). Part of the 
explanation is that, according to their own testimony, a number of them 
took up farming as an "insurance against old age"and this happened to 
coincide with the coffee boom period. Retired petty-tr8.ders, petty- bureau-
crats and blue-collar workers predominated in the sample. Third and most 
serious, they educated their sons out of agriculture or rural society, 
and, therefore, eliminated any possibility of being succeeded by a 
generation of better trained farmers. As it happens, in our sample less 
than 15 per cent of the "progressive farmers" were below 40 years of 
age. Fourth, one-fifth of them were conservative landlord-farmers who 
had no commi tmentto a bourgeois revolution. The implications of this 
agglomeration of cross-cutting criteria are largely intractable. But 
it may still be asked, can a class which is incapable of reproducing 
itself be regarded as a potent agent of a capitalist transformation? 
As has already been mentioned, the Buganda government was not 
altogether unaware of the deteriorating situation in agriculture. In 
fact in 1965 its Economic Planning Commission came closest to initia-
tin~ a proper capitalist land reform. Convinced of the incompatibility 
between legally entrenched tenancies, scattered about in a random 
fashion on the various estates, and a progressive capitalist expan-
sion, it recommended a semi-freehold 'system in which legal titles would 
be established for the tenants •. In return the tenants would be re~ 
quired to pay a consolidated annual fee to the landlords. The exact 
formulation was as follows: 
"The existing Kibanja tenants would be given a legal title 
to their plots, which could be bought and sold and pledged 
as security for loans. The owners of these kibanja tenures 
'would only lose their land if they failed to make the 
'annual payment', but the kibanja would not revert auto-
matically to the Mailo landowner, who would have to 
take the ki banj a owner to court and the 1 and would be 
sold by public auction" (Buganda Planning Commission, 
1965; p. 19). 
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This was a double-edged sword which would have forced competition for 
1 and among 1 andlo rds and t E!nant s alike and would have ensured ul t imat e 
consolidation in the hands of successful entrepreneurs through market 
forces. Needless to say, tl::e recommendations were reJected by the land-
lord-dominated Lukiiko for what was called "poli tical reasons". The 
immediate reason was that in some of the central counties of Buganda 
up to 50 per cent of the tenants are immigrants from Ruanda and Burundi, 
whom the Baganda accept" onl'y as a source of cheap labour and not as 
1 land-sharing neighbours, no matter how modest the scale. However, one 
suspects that the fundamental reason was that the landlords did not 
wish to make economic concessions to the bourgeois elite inside and 
outside Buganda. They rightly saw the latter as their class enemies. 
Secondly, they did not want to lose control over their labouring 
tenants. In a nut-shell, they were prepared to permit neither' a revi-
sion of land relations nor a transformation of production relations in 
the form of free peasants and rural proletarians. As far as that went, 
the issue could not have been any clearer. 
What is not clear are the expectations of the Buganda Planning 
Commission. Why did they suppose that the landlords would sign their 
own death warrant? Who were the entrepreneurs on whose behalf they were 
acting? Like everybody else they had assumed the existence of "progres-
sive mailo owners" who were capable of "developing their land on an 
estate basis". Historically, is not that the exact problem of the agri-
cultural revolution in Buganda? How could it be taken for granted? The 
question still stands, who are going to be the subjects of the rural 
transformation in Buganda, given its present circumstances? What would 
be the basis of their claim to such a critical historical role? 
A partial answer was given in 1966 when the oligarchical super-
structure of Buganda was forcibly dismantled by Obote's regime. In that 
occasion the traditional monarchs, the chiefs and their henchmen were 
simply dismissed as unsuited for bringing about a radical change in 
1. Given the fact that all tenanted land in Buganda amounts to 30-40 
per cent of all arable land and that the immigrant tenants could 
not have had much more than 25 per cent of that, at 2-3 acres per 
pers0n, then the issue was largely an emotive one. 
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Uganda. President Obote in his "forwarding looking"speech referred· 
.to the Buganda oligarchy as a "clique of selfish men, ~. (lords)" who 
wanted to maintain a "feudal set-up". In contrast he pledged his govern-
ment to the development of the "common man" (bawejjere). At last the 
bourgeois nationalists were staking their claim, but only as a bur.eau-'-
cratic elite. They had no clear plan for agrarian reform. The most 
they did in Bugandawas to abolish official mailo land 1 (which. 
amounted to no more than 4 per cent of the land) and. to transfer all 
public land to the national government. Constraints on the Obote govern-
ment might have been severe, but what matters is that it failed to 
institute an agrarian revolution anywhere in Uganda. In Buganda patron-
client relations on the land stayed intact, uneven distribution of land con-
tinued2 and the ideology of "progressive farmers" and "estate-farmingiipre-
i . 
vailed. The national government, having given the Buganda plutocrats short-
shrift, did not have a clear idea how' to undermine their economic base. 
A clearer view did not emerge untill 1969 when the 
Common Man's Charter - "The Move to the Left" - was announced by Pre-
sident Obote. Whereas in the 1966 national plan ("Work for Progress"), 
of which Obote was the Chairman, nothing had been said about control 
over the means of production or the terms of participation by the ·mas.s 
of the people, in the Common Man's Charter President Obote made referen-
ces to "the participation of citizens in all sectors Of the economy •••••• 
through collective bwnership, viz. cooperatives and state enterprises" 
(Article 30). But cooperatives and state enterprises had existed in 
Uganda before and do not! seem to have made any difference. As if aware 
of the meaninglessness of the statement, the President elaborated on 
his equivocation: 
."The issue of nationalisation has already been deter-
mined and therefore it is a settled matter. It was in 
the 1962 Constitution, as it is in the Republican Con-
stitution of 1967. Therefore no citizen or person in 
private enterprise should entertain the idea that the 
Government of Uganda cannot, whenever it is desirabl.e 
1. For details, see Uganda Constitution, 1967 and' 1969. 
2. In Buganda 250,000 tenants hold 30-40 per cent of the land at an 
average of 4-5 acres and a range of.08-9 acres, whereas 112,000 
landowners hold 60-70 per cent of the land at an aV,eY'<M'e of 10-
15 acres and a range of10-1,000 acres Le.they own-4-5 times as 
much land as the tenants. 
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in the interests of the people, nationalise any or all 
privately-owned interests, mailo and freehold land and 
all productive assets or property, at any time, for 
the benefit of the people. The Party, therefore, directs 
the Government to work along these lines (Article 39). 
It took five months before these declarations wer'3 given any substance. 
On 1 May, 1910 the President announced a 60 per cent take-Over by the 
Government and "the workers" of oil companies, bus services, the .copper 
mines, "every important manufacturing insdustry 841.d plantation";. of 
banks, credit institutions and insurance companies (Common Man's 
Charter, p. 42). As in the 1966 document, absolutely nothing was said 
about control and distribution of land, or about its exploitation. The 
only positive general affirmation regarding exploitation of resources and 
whi.ch is an improvement on the "nationalisation" declaration is contained 
in the statement on the "Move to the Left": 
"In this Charter, we lay emphasis first on the people 
being given massive education in operating and establi-
shing institutions controlled, not by individuals, but 
by the people collectively. The massive education 
should aim at reorientating the attitudes of the people 
towards co-operation in the management of economic 
institutions, and away from individual and private en-
richment. We therefore direct the Government tn,give 
education to the people to acquire new attitudes in 
the management of our economy where collective exploi-
tation of our resources to the benefit of all will 
take the place of individual and private enterprise 
aimed at enriching a few" (Common Man's Charter, Article 40). 
So we see that, despite the recognition by the Obote government that: 
"Agriculture is at present far the most important sector of the Uganda 
economy. It accounts for more than half of gross domestic product and 
for 80-90 per cent of overseas export earnings. Perhaps, even,moreim-
portant is the fact that as much as 90 per cent of the population are 
dependent on this sector for their incomes" (Uganda'S Second Five-
Year Plan - 1966-11; p. 55), throughout its :te.l;:l.u.J;'..e...,jJ;..,.GQ..J:;b.t,i-:r:l:'bl,ea to 
4..av"e_n.giih-SlL_g.J.~@_d._"PQ..l.,LCtlT.=oUO~.",a..,J).as:LQ~,"QQ.U..Q.~Iri,~2tl~..9ru:r.. .. "~~¥'.i-.~~,~L~,:t'Q.J;;!!l 
~~E.2,.li~r:..,.~,~l£t~wh.aJ:,§",~;i"n,,~llgoo<ia.~~~~? 
Conclusions 
Obote, a bourgeois nationalist, was violently opposed to what 
he called" semi-feudalists" and "neo-tradi tionalist s". But the imme-
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diate reason :why llew~s Jll1aqJE3 t(J deal with themeffecti:v:ely -is that 
he lacked political organisation at the grass-roots level. He was 
thus confined to administrative manuoevres and was extremely fearful 
i ' 
of a popular rebellion in Buganda in ~he event of his government 
tackling seriously the sensitive land question there. The more basic 
reason for his failure is that he represented a weak class economically, 
the politico-bureaucratic elite. This is more a consuming than an 
investing class and in .underdeveloped countries its control overland, 
as a class, is usually minimal. That leaves the landlords and kulaks 
in command in the countryside. Rretences aside, both classes are not 
knownfor their technological· and economic dynamism. As we have seen, 
Buganda is no exception. There are two main contradictions implicit 
in this passage. One is the emergence of a bourgeois nation state 
without a capitalist class in the true economic sense. The other is 
the effective control of the greatest national asset, land, by anti~ 
capitalist elements. The phenomenon is general in Africa and it might 
be worthwhile to ponder its implications. 
Historically-speaking, the quint essence of Buganda' s underdevelop-
ment in common with other underdeveloped regions is its incorporation 
into capit.aJ.ist . production and marketing, without being given a 
chance to develop the material forces and the production relations 
appropriate to that economic mode. The latter was the monopoly of the 
colonialists and so was distribution. The tutelary intervention by the 
British at the various critical points in Buganda; with all its civi-
lising influence, dialectically, created a dependency relation - Pros-
peros and Cali bans. Therefore, the pr6blem of rural developmen~ in 
Buganda is not merely how to increase productivity per man per· acre, 
., . 
. but rather the production or deliverance of such men and women. If 
imperialism committed underdeveloped countries to a parasitic and lop-:-
:J: 
. sided capitalism, then in Uganda post-independence policies did· a 
great deal to re-inforce that prior position. Hence, there is a need 
for a re-direction of society. In Buganda this would entail a radical 
revision of the existing land relations, an abolition of the landlord-
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tenant relationship 1 and a transfer of effective control over land to 
the majority of the people. This is not to b,e understood as a romantic 
"hand-over to the people" for the' maintenance of a primitive and out-
mod,ed subsistence agriculture on small, isolated plots. ',That would cons-
ti tute TIO improvement on the idea of "progr~ssive farmers". A radical 
revision of production-relations should be seen as a necessary corol'-
lary of changed land-relations. Land ShOUldl~ade available forsurplu~, 
production and the people who, historically and politically, can afford 
I 
neither to be capitalists or subsistence men, must be organised and, 
trained to carry out the task of economic development. This is remini-
, , 
scent of President Obote's call before the demise of his government 
for a "massive education aimed at r'eorientating the attitudes of the 
people towards co-operation in the management of economic institutions, 
away from individual and private enrichment". But as Obote now knows 
and as is wont of all revolutions, this takes political courage and 
ideological clarity. In Uganda, if the Buganda landed oligarchy and 
kulaks have been obscurantist and economically decadent, the national 
political elite and staff have been equally obtuse and ideologically 
, decadent. 
1. In Buganda this is not desirable so much because of shortage of 
land among the general populace but mainly because as an institution 
and a way of life, it militates against the development of atti-
tudes and modes of behaviour which are appropriate to the required 
, social and economic transformation. Conservative writers such as 
West who advise against nationalisation or abolition of private 
land interests on the grounds that it "would merely alienate a 
large and influential group of landowners without necessarily help-
ing the tenants and (that) it would present Government with an 
administrative task which could not possibly be handled (West, 
1973; p. 189) miss the point and, above all, are perpetuating 
the same colonial ideology'. 
Archie Mafej e 
January, 1973, The Hague. 
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